
00233

1971/12/11



WASHINGTON

Berun)

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

December II, 1971

MEMO FOR:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM:

WINSTON LORDW

SUBJECT:

December 10, 1971 Meet-

ing with Huang

Attached for your signature at Tab A is a memorandum for the President summarizin; last night's meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo at Tab A.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

THE WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND979520
By LCB NARA Bate 10/10

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT:

My December 10 Meeting with the

Chinese in New York

I met for almost two hours with Chinese UN Permanent Representative Huang Hua early in the evening of December 10, 1971 to discuss South Asia. Deputy Permanent Representative Chien Chiu and two interpreters were also on their side, while Ambassador Bush, General Haig, and Winston Lord accompanied me.

The main objective of the meeting was to inform Peking (using Huang given General Walters' absence from Paris) fully about our various moves concerning South Asia and to indicate our approval of Chinese support for Pakistan, including diversionary troop movements. This I did, but Huang seemed to be struck more by our possible cooperation with Moscow to legitimize a political solution in East Pakistan than our long list of military, political, and psychological efforts to support Islamabad and deter Indian actions against West Pakistan.

I rejoined that we had no intention of pressuring Pakistan; that we would support what it wanted in the UN and elsewhere; and that our various actions underlined our attitude. However, we were faced with the practical situation that the Pakistani army in the East was finished and that it had only a few weeks in the West. Thus, the crucial issue now was to preserve its territory and army against possible broader Indian/Soviet designs. I pointedly noted that the easy course was to do what the Chinese suggested, confine oneself to "principled" hard line speeches in the UN while the military realities sunk Pakistan.

This session turned out to be useful on two counts. First, despite Huang's lack of acknowledgement, I think Peking will be impressed by the various actions we are taking, and might be more inclined to step up

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NWD979520 - 2
By LGB NARA Date 10114

its own activities. Secondly, it was very helpful for our UN strategy and my talk with Bhutto the next morning to be reminded of Chinese sensitivities on any legitimization of Bangla Desh in UN resolutions or elsewhere, and on Washington-Moscow cooperation. I came away from the meeting believing that we should omit political aspects from UN resolutions and go for ceasefire alone. This course of action was confirmed in my session with Bhutto, Raza, Shahi the next morning.

Sequence of Meeting

The sequence went as follows. I first gave a detailed account of our activities over the past few days: our public statements and my backgrounder; our UN role; our military and economic aid cutoff for New Delhi, and possible future steps; our strong demarches to the Soviet Union including your letter exchanges with Brezhnev (from which I quoted), and meeting with their Agricultural Minister; the Soviet proposal for a settlement; our encouragement of third countries to provide military equipment to Pakistan; and the movement of our carrier task forces toward the Bay of Bengal.

I then said that we would keep the PRC informed, if it were interested, of Soviet troop mevements that we meniter by satellite. With all this background, I got to the main point: It was of course up to the PRC to decide its own course of action in this situation, but you wanted it to know that "if the People's Republic were to consider the situation on the Indian subcontinent a threat to its security, and if it took measures to protect its security, the United States would oppose efforts of others to interfere with the People's Republic." We were not recommending any particular steps but were simply informing Peking about the actions of others

I followed this with our estimates of the military situation in the subcontinent, saying that the highest priority was now to deter India from attacking West Pakistan and turning it into a Nepal just as it had already all but assured that East Pakistan would be a Bhutan. We had thus relayed Brezhner proposal to Yahya as a possible opening, especially since Moscow's statement that political negotiations should pick up from where they left off in March would mean that it would not support a Bangla Desh. Yahya had just responded by saying there should be a ceasefire, separation of forces, and political negotiations. Pointing our reports that Mrs. Gandhi might seek to take Kashmiri territory and destroy Pakistan's armed forces, I closed by saying that to save West Pakistan we needed maximum pressure on New Delh (Irwin had just warned Tha) and to some extent Moscow, plus maximum pressure for a ceasefire.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES (

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND979520

By GB NARA Bate 10110

Huang responded by pointing to strong Chinese support of ceasefire and withdrawal, coupled with blasts against the emergence of Bangla Desh, which smacked of Japan's Manchuko state and threatened others' security. He said that the UN voting underlined the world's people's opposition to Indian designs and said that the UN General Assembly resolution (ceasefire and withdrawal) was the minimum that should be pressed for. Accordingly, it seemed to him that "the position taken by the U.S. Government has been a weak one," straying towards a political solution that would make Bangla Desh a reality.

In effect Huang was suggesting that whatever our intentions, objectively we were cooperating with Moscow to accomplish Indian ends. He said that rather than seek expediency, struggle should go on, for principle and justice would win in the end, despite setbacks. He recalled the Chinese Communists' eventual victory over adversity. The Chinese were ready to take on all comers in guerilla war, with "millet and rifle," and start their reconstruction all over again.

I came back firmly, reiterating our support for Pakistan, which was very difficult for you politically, pointing to the practical military situation, and contrasting the rhetoric route of the Chinese with our concrete actions. We had asked for this meeting to solicit Chinese military help for Pakistan, not to prepare the PRC for a squeeze on Pakistan. We were out to preserve Pakistan and its army, were not reluctant to condemn India, and would not deal with Bangla Desh. But we faced the practical problem of what to do in the face of possible Pakistani collapse in the West as well as the East. Whether it was better to have a ceasefire or let military events continue, what was needed was pressure on both India and the Soviet Union.

I closed by saying that we would see what Pakistan wanted, e.g. in my talks with Bhutto the next day, and tell it to check with the PRC. We were prepared to listen to any practical proposals for parallel action and would do our best to prevent pressure against any country that took unilateral action. Huang reaffirmed that he would immediately relay all this information to Chou En-lai.

Interestingly the very next day, December II, we received our first hard news that Chinese troops were moving toward India's Northeast Frontier area. While this decision clearly was taken before Chou could have known of our New York meeting, this session could only help to reinforce Chinese penchant for action.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY